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Quantity is the first category that Aristotle lists after substance. More than any 
other category, it has an extraordinary epistemological clarity. “2 + 2 = 4” is the 
paradigm of objective and irrefutable knowledge, and “2 million + 2 million = 
4 million” is not far behind in certainty, despite its distance from immediate 
perception. Indeed, certainties about quantity extend to the infinite – for example, we 
know that the counting numbers do not run out. Nor does this certainty come at the 
expense of application to reality. If we put two rabbits and two rabbits in a box, and 
later find five rabbits in there, it is our absolute certainty that 2 + 2 = 4 that allows us 
to infer that the rabbits must have bred. Continuous quantities are no less open to 
perfection of knowledge: the quantity π, the ratio of the circumference of any circle to 
its diameter, is calculable to any degree of precision that computers can cope with 
(currently claimed to be 10 trillion decimal places1). The mathematics of quantity 
delivers certainty about reality, to the envy of other disciplines including philosophy. 
Despite its clarity, quantity is subject to some philosophical subtleties and 
unresolved puzzles. Let us start with two crucial distinctions that organize the types of 
quantity: extensive (or divisible) versus intensive quantity, and continuous versus 
discrete quantity. 
 
Extensive versus intensive quantities 
 
Modern physics makes a basic distinction between extensive quantities like length 
and mass, and intensive ones like temperature and speed. 2 
If a body has length 2 metres, it consists of two parts, each of length one metre. It 
is the same with mass or volume: a two-unit mass or volume consists (in many 
different ways) of two parts of unit mass or volume. A time of 2 seconds consists of 
 
1 http://www.numberworld.org/misc_runs/pi-10t/details.html 
2 M.R. Cohen and E. Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, abridged ed, Routledge, 
London, 1939, 183-7. 
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two parts, each of one second. Such a quantity is called “extensive”. In the language 
of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, “a quantity that is additive 
for independent, non-interacting subsystems is called extensive.”3 
Extensive quantities are easy to measure since a unit can be repeated to fill up the 
quantity to be measured. For example, a length can be measured by concatenating 
identical rods, because the length occupied by the rods is the sum of the lengths of 
each one. 
“Quantity”, in the definition of Aristotle and hence of the scholastics, meant only 
extensive quantity. Aristotle writes: 
‘Quantum’ means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts of 
which each is by nature a ‘one’ and a ‘this’. A quantum is a plurality if it is 
numerable, a magnitude if it is measurable. ‘Plurality’ means that which is 
divisible potentially into non-continuous parts, ‘magnitude’ that which is 
divisible into continuous parts.4 
“Intensive” quantities are very different. Modern science includes among 
paradigm quantities measurable intensities such as temperature and speed, which do 
not distribute over parts like length and mass do. A body with speed two metres per 
second does not consist of two parts with speeds one metre per second each, nor does 
a body of temperature 100 degrees consist of two parts of 50 degrees each.  
“Intensive” quantities were not recognised as quantities by ancient science and 
philosophy. Aristotle classifies them in the category of quality, and allows only that 
they may be (qualitatively) more or less intense.5 In that he agreed with ancient 
science, which had no units of speed or temperature. The later scholastics, however, 
did come to recognise that such intensities were quantifiable, and their discussions of 
the “intension and remission of forms” laid the basis for the measurement of such 
quantities in modern physics. 
 
3 International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC), Quantities, Units and Symbols in 
Physical Chemistry (“The Green Book”), Third Edition, IUPAC & RSC Publishing, Cambridge, 2007, 
6. 
4 Aristotle, Metaphysics bk 5 ch. 13, 1020a7-12. 
5 Aristotle, Categories 8 (10b27-29). To translate as “admit of variations of degree”, as is often done, 
may suggest to us a numerical scale of degrees, a suggestion not present in the original language of 
“admit the more and the less”. Discussion in J.-L. Solère, The question of intensive magnitudes 
according to some Jesuits in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Monist 84 (2001), 582-616, at 
583-4. 
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Within intensive quantities, there is a significant distinction between those like 
speed which are measurable on a ratio scale, which are more essentially quantitative, 
and than those like temperature which are not. Speed is a rate, that is, a derivative in 
the sense of calculus, of one extensive quantity (length travelled) with respect to 
another extensive quantity (time taken). Thus two miles per hour is a speed which is 
necessarily twice one mile per hour – the measurability of length and time implies the 
measurability of the rate of one with respect to the other, and also the possibility of 
adding speeds and multiplying them by numbers. This was a discovery of the 
fourteenth century scholastic writers of the Merton School, who, although they did not 
measure speed in any units, realised that speed could be said to be uniform or not, 
depending on how distance travelled varied with time taken.6 One of them writes: “Of 
local motions, then, that motion is called uniform in which an equal distance is 
continuously traversed with equal velocity in an equal part of time.”7 Their French 
contemporary Nicole Oresme invented graphs to display the possible uniform and 
non-uniform ways in which one quality can vary with another. His graphs are 
conceived of as drawn across the object subject to the variation, and the vertical axis 
indicates the intensity of the quality. Oresme says the heights measure the ratios of 
intensities, hence presupposing that intensities are on a ratio scale.8 His graphs do not 
have scales on either axis, as their purpose is simply to indicate the overall “shape” of 
the variation: 
 
 
6 E. Sylla, Medieval quantifications of qualities: The “Merton School”, Archive for History of Exact 
Sciences 8 (1/2) (1971), 9-39. 
7 William Heytesbury, Rules for Solving Sophisms, c. 1335, excerpted in E. Grant, A Source Book in 
Medieval Science, Harvard University Press, 1974, 238. 
8 M. Clagett, Nicole Oresme and the Medieval Geometry of Qualities and Motions, Madison, Wisc: 
Unversity of Wisconsin Press, 1978, 179, 199-201. 
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Fig 1. A page of graphs from the printed edition of Oresme[?]’s 
Tractatus de latitudinibus formarum (1505) 
(from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Oresmes_diagrams_full_page.gif) 
 
 Forces too admit ratios between them, although forces are not rates – applying 
two forces of 1 newton at the same place and in the same direction results in a 2-
newton force, so forces are additive and stand in ratios in a straightforward way. That 
is not the case with quantities that are more essentially qualitative, like temperature, 
hardness, intensity of hue, and IQ and other psychological variables. Such quantities 
5 
 
have no natural zero, nor does it usually make sense to speak of double such a 
quantity. Attempts to convert the ordering of the degrees of the quality into a 
numerical scale are typically complex and subject to philosophical concerns about 
possible lack of validity.9 There is no prospect of measuring IQ by concatenation of 
rods. 
The nature of intensive quantities, vis-à-vis extensive ones, is to some degree 
clarified by the old scholastic debate as to whether intensification of qualities occurs 
by addition of parts. Scotus and Ockham (for the affirmative) held that a blue’s 
becoming more intense, for example, is due to an overlaying of more and more parts 
of blueness. They pointed to the example of illumination, where addition of candles 
increases the illumination of a nearby surface, suggesting that illumination itself 
increases by addition of parts.10 That would make intensive quantities close to 
extensive ones (though not identical to them, since it may not be true that the parts are 
comparable in size and hence quantitatively additive). Aquinas denies the addition 
theory, at least in many cases. While allowing that it may be true of illumination, he 
says that charity is a “simple form”: there are no such things as numerically distinct 
miniature pieces of charity which could be added together to produce an intense 
charity. A more intense charity can only differ from a less intense charity by charity 
being in the subject more intensely.11 
In general, the question as to whether an intensive quantity is intensified by 
addition is a matter for empirical science. For example, if degree of illumination is 
found to be analysable in terms of number of incident photons, then illumination is 
intensified by addition. But it is strange that speed, which we understand so 
thoroughly, remains an ambiguous case. Although speeds can certainly grow by a 
kind of addition, as when I walk forward in a moving train and my speed over the 
ground is the sum of the train’s speed and my walking speed, it is doubtful if the two 
speeds are parts of the resultant speed. The notion of part seems neither clearly 
applicable nor clearly inapplicable to speeds. 
 
9 J. Michell, Measurement in Psychology: A Critical History of a Methodological Concept, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
10 Sylla, Medieval quantifications of qualities (op. cit. n. 6), 11-15. 
11 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II q. 24 art 5; a modern version of the dispute in M. Eddon, 
Armstrong on quantities and resemblance, Philosophical Studies 136 (2007), 385-404. 
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Discrete versus continuous quantity 
 
Aristotle’s remark, quoted earlier, on the numerable versus the measurable refers 
to another major distinction within quantity: that between discrete (or atomic) and 
continuous. 
Aristotle explains the difference as “divisible into non-continuous (respectively 
continuous) parts”. “Continuous” could be read as “contiguous”, that is, “touching”. It 
thus relies on a quasi-spatial notion, with the parts laid out on some kind of “space” 
and either having no meaningful space joining them (in the discrete case, such as 
whole numbers or the syllables of words) or occupying all the intervening space (in 
the continuous case as in length or mass). That raises the question of whether there is 
a “topic-neutral” concept of space (in which variation can occur), which is wider than 
the notion of physical space, and in principle could apply to other categories. 
It appears from Aristotle’s own statements about other categories that there ought 
to be such a concept. As we have just seen, he admits “the more and the less” (that is, 
continuous variation) in the category of quality, which he sharply distinguishes from 
the categories of quantity and space. Time admits variation and “distances” between 
instants. Less noticed is that Aristotle also admits continuous variation in the category 
of substance, when he suggests that there could be a continuous range of primitive 
species stretching from non-living to living.12 Aristotle’s insights are confirmed by 
modern mathematics, which has developed formalisations (that is, topic-neutral 
characterisations) of the notions of “metric space” and “topological space”, which can 
apply to any “space”, physical or otherwise, across which variation can occur.13 
Nevertheless the category of quantity is the one where most of the mathematical 
interest in the discrete and the continuous has focussed. The interplay of discrete and 
 
12 J. Franklin, Aristotle on species variation, Philosophy 61 (1986), 245-52; debate summarised in H. 
Granger, Aristotle’s natural kinds, Philosophy 64 (1989), 245-7. 
13 W.A. Sutherland, Introduction to Metric and Topological Spaces, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1975, 19-21, 45; relations of modern mathematical developments to Aristotle described in A. 
Newstead, Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the Continuum, in Aristotle and 
Contemporary Science II, ed. D. Sfendoni-Mentzou, J. R. Brown and J. Hattiangadi, Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2001, 113-129; S. Hegarty Aristotle’s notion of quantity and modern mathematics, 
Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 18 (1969), 25-35. 
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continuous is one of the great themes of mathematics. Mathematical work stemmed 
from an early Greek discovery about ratios of quantities: the fundamental distinctness 
of continuous and discrete quantity. It is far from clear initially whether the two kinds 
of quantity have much in common, for example whether the ratio ‘the double’ has 
much in common with the counting number 2.14 Perhaps the first truly surprising 
result in mathematics was the one attributed (traditionally but without much evidence) 
to Pythagoras, the proof of the incommensurability of the side and diagonal of a 
square. It is natural to think that it is possible to convert any continuous quantity to a 
discrete one by choosing units on a ruler. Given a ruler divided finely enough, it 
should be possible to compare any continuous quantities, say lengths, by counting 
exactly how many times the ruler’s unit is needed to measure each quantity. One 
length might be 127 times the unit and another 41 times, showing that the ratio of the 
lengths is 127 to 41. Surely by choosing the unit small enough, one could compare 
exactly any two lengths? But “Pythagoras” proved that for those two naturally 
occurring lengths, the diagonal and side of a square, this is impossible: there is no 
unit, no matter how small, such that both the diagonal and side are whole-number 
multiples of it. The diagonal and side of a square are “incommensurable”. So the 
ratios of continuous quantities are more varied than the relations of discrete quantities. 
Therefore geometry, and continuous quantity in general, is in some fundamental sense 
richer than arithmetic and not reducible to it via choice of units. While much about the 
continuous can be captured through discrete approximations, it always has secrets in 
reserve.15 
The differing origins of continuous and discrete quantity led to some classical 
problems in Aristotelian philosophy of quantity. The emphasis on the distinctness of 
the discrete and the continuous produced a mystery as to why some of the more 
structural features of the two kinds of ratios should be identical, such as the principle 
 
14 Newton emphasizes the distinction in one of his magisterial pronouncements, “By Number we 
understand not so much a Multitude of Unities, as the abstracted Ratio of any Quantity, to another 
Quantity of the same kind, which we take for Unity.” (I. Newton, Arithmetica Universalis (1728), 2; 
similar in L. Euler, Elements of Algebra, 3rd ed, London, 1822; both discussed in Bigelow and 
Pargetter, Science and Necessity, 60-61.) 
15 J. Franklin, What Science Knows: And How It Knows It, New York: Encounter Books, 2009, 118-
122. The continuous can be done discretely, in a way, but only with “continuum many” points, that is, 
a higher order of infinity. 
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of alternation of ratios (that if the ratio of a to b equals the ratio of c to d,  then the 
ratio of a to c equals that of b to d). Is this principle part of a “universal mathematics”, 
a science of quantity in general?16 
These questions point to the need to examine closely the most central concept of 
quantity, ratio. 
 
Ratios 
 
The crucial concept of quantity is ratio or proportion. It applies, as we saw, to all 
extensive quantities and those intensive quantities such as speed that are quantitative 
in the fullest sense – those in which it makes sense to say that one quantity of a kind is 
twice another. John Bigelow, one of the most Aristotelian of recent philosophers of 
mathematics, introduces ratios as follows. The Aristotelian language is chosen to keep 
close to physically real relations: 
Physical objects, like elephants and Italians, humming-birds and Hottentots, 
have many physical properties and relations: volume and surface area, for 
example. And the physical properties of these objects stand in important 
relations to one another. In particular, such physical properties stand in 
relations of proportion to one another. There is a relation between the 
surface area of the humming-bird and that of the Hottentot; and this may or 
may not be the same as the relationship that holds between the surface areas 
of an Italian and an elephant. 
Relationships such as proportion will hold not only between surface areas 
but also between volumes. Conceivably, the relationship between the 
surface areas of two objects might be the same as the relationship between 
volumes for two other objects. But it is a fact of considerable biological 
significance that the relation between surface areas of two objects will not, 
in general, be the same as the relationship between their volumes. Ignoring 
differences in shape (say, by supposing an elephant were shaped like an 
 
16 C.B. Crowley, Universal Mathematics in Aristotelian-Thomistic Philosophy (Washington, DC, 
1980). 
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Italian, or vice versa), it turns out that if the elephant has ten times the 
height then it will have a hundred times the surface area and a thousand 
times the volume. The volumes of the elephant and the Italian, or the 
Hottentot and the humming-bird, will be ‘more different’ than their surface 
areas. There are several distinct relationships present; furthermore, there are 
distinctive ways in which these relationships differ from one another. There 
are also distinctive relationships among these relationships. These facts have 
consequences of physical significance: for instance, with regard to problems 
of heat regulation. It is from such fertile soil as this that most of 
mathematics has grown.17 
 
Thus for example the universal “being 1.57 kilograms in mass” stands in a certain 
relation, a ratio, to the universal “being 0.35 kilograms in mass”. Pairs of lengths can 
stand in that same ratio, as can pairs of time intervals. The ratio itself is just what 
those binary relations between pairs of masses, lengths and time intervals have in 
common (“A ratio is a sort of relation in respect of size between two magnitudes of 
the same kind”, as Euclid says.18) 
The nature of ratios has been clarified by another scholastic dispute, this time a 
more recent one. It is debated whether quantities are monadic or relational. One side 
(Armstrong, Swoyer) hold that there are basic quantities like lengths, and then there 
are ratios between them. The other side (Bigelow and Pargetter) hold that only the 
ratios are absolute, and a quantity is merely a position in the system of ratios: there are 
no absolute lengths, only ratios of lengths. For comparison, it appears that colours are 
absolute or monadic (a colour is the particular shade it is, irrespective of its relation to 
other colours), whereas there may be no absolute positions in time, but only the 
positions of an instant relative to others (those theses may themselves be debatable, 
but prima facie they give examples of respectively monadic and relational properties 
with which quantity can be compared). 
 
17 J. Bigelow, Sets are haecceities, in Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D.M. 
Armstrong, ed. J. Bacon, K. Campbell and L. Reinhardt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993, ch. 4, at 74-5. 
18 Euclid, Elements, book V definition 3. 
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Bigelow and Pargetter argue, in favour of the relational theory, that just as 
attributing intrinsic position to points would not explain why one is east of another 
(since the positions themselves must stand in that relation), so it is with “being twice 
as massive as”: 
You may try to ground this in intrinsic properties of determinate masses. But 
why should object a’s having one property and object b’s having another 
property entail a’s being twice as massive as b? We must presuppose a relation 
between the property of a and the property of b. The property of being this mass 
must stand in a relation of proportion to the property of having that mass.19 
So since relationality is unavoidable, they say, it should be regarded as basic: “for 
an individual to have a particular determinate property is just for it to stand in a 
particular range of relationships to other individuals.” 
Armstrong argues to the contrary that it seems that objects have monadic 
properties and the relations between them supervene and are true in every possible 
world: “Is it not the case that, for example a has the monadic property of being two 
kilograms in mass, while b has the property of being one kilogram in mass, and if any 
two things have these properties, then in every possible world the first is twice as 
massive as the second?” If the relation were external, as Bigelow and Pargetter think, 
it would be hard to explain why the ratio of the mass of an object to an identical one 
must be 1:1. 20 Unlike the case of “earlier than”, where objects can retain their 
intrinsic properties while moving around so as to break the relation, objects cannot 
change their massiness without changing their mass ratios to other objects. Again, as 
Armstrong says, what if there were only one mass in universe? In that case, there 
would be no ratios to other objects to constitute its mass; yet it is hard to believe that 
it would lack a determinate mass (for example, it would take a certain force to push it 
 
19 Bigelow and Pargetter, Science and Necessity, 55-6; also in J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Quantities, 
Philosophical Studies 54 (1988), 287-304; comment in J. Forge, Bigelow and Pargetter on quantities, 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4) (1995), 594-605; formalization in B. Mundy, Extensive 
measurement and ratio functions, Synthese 75 (1988), 1–23. 
20 D.M. Armstrong, Are quantities relations? A reply to Bigelow and Pargetter, Philosophical Studies 
54 (1988), 305-316, at 308; similar in C. Swoyer, The metaphysics of measurement, in J. Forge, ed. 
Measurement, Realism and Objectivity: Essays on Measurement in the Social and Physical Sciences, 
Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987, 235-290. There is undoubtedly one quantity (of any given kind) that is 
absolute, because it stands in no ratio to the others; namely, the zero quantity. However, it could be 
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with a certain acceleration, according to the nomic connections of Newton’s second 
law). Finally, if mass were quantized and there were just two atoms in the universe, 
then the mass ratio of their sum to each of them is determined to be “twice as 
massive”, and it seems clear that that ratio is not freestanding but supervenes on (is 
true in virtue of) the repetition of the objects (since mass is an extensive quantity). 
So there are reasons to favour the theory that quantities such as mass are monadic 
and that the ratios between them supervene on the determinate quantities.  
 
Characterizing “quantity” 
 
In the light of the above, it is natural to attempt a definition of “quantity”. What 
kinds of properties should count as “quantities”? Given that Aristotle’s definition 
applies only to extensive quantities, and that the quantification of intensities tends to 
blur the distinction between the categories of quantity and quality, it is unclear if any 
coherent view of quantity is available in the Aristotelian tradition. 
Starting from Aristotle’s concept of what is “subject to more and less”, a possible 
alternative can be based on the mathematics of order structures. A partial order (in 
mathematical terminology) is a binary relation that is reflexive, antisymmetric and 
transitive. (An example is inclusion among sets: it arranges sets in an ordering of 
smaller and larger, but not every pair of sets is comparable.) A linear or total order is a 
partial order in which any two elements are comparable (for example, “greater than” 
among whole numbers).21 In the language of measurement theory, the items are said 
to be comparable on an ordinal scale; however, the “scale”, in the sense of a scale of 
numbers, is not part of the definition but a consequence: if items are linearly ordered, 
they may be assigned numbers such that items later in the ordering have greater 
numbers. If items are linearly ordered, it may or may not be that there is a notion of 
distance between the items being ordered, that is, it is meaningful to compare the 
interval between a and b with that between c and d, as less, equal or more (in the 
 
argued that the zero quantity should be considered a non-being and hence not truly part of the system of 
quantities. (Debate in Y. Balashov, Zero-valued physical quantities, Synthese 119 (199), 253-286). 
21 B.A Davey and H.A. Priestley, Introduction to Lattices and Order, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, ch. 2. 
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language of measurement theory, the items are comparable on an interval scale). If so, 
it may or may not be that the items have a size such that the ratio between sizes is 
meaningful (“comparable on a ratio scale”). 
The most core or paradigmatic quantities are those comparable on at least an 
interval scale. That implies that the ordering of items is a system isomorphic to the 
continuum, or to a piece of it (for example, the interval from 0 to 1, in the case of 
probabilities) or a substructure of it (such as the rationals or integers). It is not entirely 
out of the question to call a purely ordinal scale such as the 1-to-10 scale of mineral 
hardness or IQ a “quantity”,22 but it is stretching the meaning of the term because 
there is no “quantum” or repeatable atom separating items and care is needed not to 
attribute meaning to differences between items. 
One may more loosely call any (not necessarily linear) order structure a kind of 
quantity (in that it permits some comparisons on a kind of scale). Thus vectors and 
complex numbers can be called quantities in that all the real-number multiples of a 
fixed one form a linear order and are thus subject to comparison as “more or less”. 
Although ones in different directions are not strictly comparable, direction varies 
continuously and hence a vector is approximately comparable with one in a nearby 
direction; vectors in different directions are also comparable in respect of length.23 
One might go so far as to allow fuzzy quantities (such as imprecise probabilities) 
by a family resemblance, as they share the properties of the continuum except for 
absolute precision.24 
 
Puzzles on the relation of quantity and space 
 
Quantity and space, according to Aristotle, are different categories. That leads to a 
number of difficult problems on the relation of the spatial quantities (length, area and 
 
22 As commonly done in the social sciences; see N. Cliff and J.A. Keats, Ordinal Measurement in the 
Behavioral Sciences, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2003. Another suggestion in B. Hale, Reals by 
abstraction, Philosophia Mathematica 8 (2000), 100-123, at 106. 
23 Discussions in Bigelow and Pargetter, Science and Necessity, section 2.6;  Bigelow, Reality of 
Numbers, part II(c); S. Leuenberger and P. Keller, Introduction: the philosophy of vectors, 
Dialectica 63 (4) (2009), 369–380 and other papers in the same special issue. 
24 On “value indefiniteness” in the quantities of quantum mechanics, see J. Forge, Quantities in 
quantum mechanics, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 14 (2000), 43-56. 
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volume) to real space. These problems are not artifacts of an arbitrary classification of 
categories, but genuine. We will try to explain what these puzzles are but will not try 
to solve them fully. 
A body of length one metre must, it seems, occupy an extent of space of exactly 
one metre – though not any particular one-metre part of space. So there is a very close 
relation between length and the properties of space. Yet it appears also that while 
truths about quantity are all necessary, it is a contingent matter what shape space has – 
that was the lesson of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries. So how do the 
necessities of quantity “fit” (so to speak) into the contingent truths of space? 
A precise version of the problem arises in another context, the continuum. The 
continuum (now modelled by the real number line) is the essential ingredient in the 
real functions that are the basic tools of mathematical physics. The continuum was 
once supposed to be instantiated necessarily to the real space we live in, implying in 
particular that real space is infinitely divisible. Euclid’s geometry incorporates that 
assumption. David Hume argued that that could not be right, as our limited sense 
knowledge cannot support knowledge of the infinite divisibility of space.25  
Philosophers and mathematicians alike dismissed him as one ignorant of the mysteries 
of geometry, but he was right – the geometry that real space has, on the small scale as 
much as the large, is a contingent matter to be decided by observation and experiment, 
not a necessary truth to be laid down a priori. What, then, is “the continuum”, if it is 
not the structure of real space? 
To answer such questions, let us take possibly the simplest problem of this kind. 
We have observational knowledge of lengths in the mid-range size – at least from 
grains of sand to mountains. It is a truth about ratios that twice and half a length is 
also a length (just as twice a whole number is a number). Lengths do not run out, any 
more than numbers do. But instantiated lengths may well run out. If the universe is 
finite in size, then no lengths longer than the diameter of the universe are instantiated, 
and if space is atomic, no length shorter than the size of an atom of space is 
instantiated. What then does it mean to speak of the system of all lengths and to state 
necessary truths about the relations within it? 
14 
 
The problem is a particularly clear and urgent case of the “problem of 
uninstantiated universals” discussed among Aristotelian philosophers. Should Hume’s 
example of an uninstantiated shade of blue be said to exist in some sense, or must all 
universals be instantiated in order to have any reality at all? Many Aristotelians argue 
that admitting uninstantiated universals would be excessively Platonist, in 
acknowledging a realm of Forms beyond the real world, ungrounded in any true 
reality.26 They must say, then, that lengths greater than the diameter of the universe 
(for example) are mere possibilities. The difficulty for that suggestion is that those 
“mere” possibilities appear themselves to stand in ratios to each other, in ways 
correctly described by mathematics. The “mere” possibilities thus themselves form a 
Platonic-like world of forms, of complex structure, the truths of which have no 
apparent truthmaker. Our knowledge of ratios, such as that three times a length lies 
between twice and four times that length, applies to lengths beyond the diameter of 
the universe. Those truths stand ready to be, so to speak, clothed in reality if the 
universe expands. 
Brent Mundy argues for the reality of uninstantiated universals by asking how a 
general theory of quantity relates to empirical evidence about quantities. A nominalist 
theory faces the problem that standard postulates of the theory of (extensive) quantity 
such as that the sum of two quantities is a quantity are literally false (for example, if 
mass means, operationally, measurement in a balance, then two large enough masses 
may be too large to fit together in a balance, though they do fit individually). That 
problem is shared by an Aristotelian realism that admits only instantiated quantities: 
the sum of two instantiated lengths may not be instantiated. Mundy suggests that with 
a posteriori realism – one which takes it as a matter for science to determine which 
universals there are – the empirical evidence supports the reality a determinable 
quantity more than of the collection of those determinates that happen to be 
instantiated. On grounds of theoretical simplicity, length in general is the theoretical 
entity that makes sense of the empirical evidence, not lengths-in-the-instantiated 
 
25 J. Franklin, Achievements and fallacies in Hume’s account of infinite divisibility, Hume Studies 20 
(1994), 85-101. 
26 D.M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Westview Press, 1989, 75-82. 
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range.27 To restrict lengths to the instantiated range would be a “simplification” 
analogous to supposing that only observed bodies exist – it fails to posit the natural 
range of which the data happen to be a sample. 
It is the same with mathematical structures such as the continuum, Euclidean 
geometry or infinite numbers. Those can be described as (possibly) uninstantiated 
structures or as (merely) possible structures, but in either case they describe a 
complex form which may be instantiated in reality – a form about which there can be 
necessary knowledge. They differ from the Forms of classical Platonism which 
necessarily lie beyond mundane reality and cannot be literally instantiated in it. 
Aristotelian forms can be instantiated, but it is for the contingencies of historical 
reality (or the will of God, or whatever decides such matters) to determine which are 
in fact instantiated. 
Because of the tendency of quantity to apply across vast ranges of size, it is not 
easy to make sense of in terms of a strict Aristotelian realism that does not admit 
uninstantiated universals. The best attempt to do so is the combinatorial theory of 
possibility of David Armstrong. Armstrong holds that possibilities are recombinations 
of actual elements in the world – there being a unicorn is possible because it is a 
recombination of parts of actually existing entities. But combination is to allow 
addition and deletion of actually existing particulars (but not addition of universals): 
“Combination is to be understood widely. It includes the notion of expansion (perhaps 
‘repetition’ is a less misleading term) and also contraction.”28 Individuals are to be 
allowed to clone themselves indefinitely, indeed infinitely often, to create new 
possibilities. 
The difficulty is that the possibility of very large or infinite numbers is then built 
into the theory, or presupposed by it, rather than analysed by it. Why are numbers 
larger than those instantiated in the universe possible? Because the actual individuals 
in the universe are subject to “indefinite multiplication”.29 (Similarly, the possibility 
of a length greater than the diameter of the universe is grounded in the possibility of 
 
27 B. Mundy, The metaphysics of quantity, Philosophical Studies 51 (1) (1987), 29-54; Mundy calls his 
position “naturalistic Platonism”, but it is identical to Aristotelian realism with uninstantiated 
universals. 
28 D.M. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
37. 
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replication of actual individuals to give a body of greater total length: an 
uninstantiated quantity is “combinatorially accessible from actual” quantities.30) But 
what is the ground of the possibility of indefinite replication of individuals itself? The 
theory does not say. Instead it has to assume that possibility in order to get started.31 
What, for example, is the ground of the possibility of some particular infinite 
cardinal? It is the possibility that actual individuals should be infinitely replicated (at 
least) that many times (a possibility normally regarded as controversial, in view 
Aristotelian doubts about actual infinities). That may indeed be the ground, but the 
combinatorial theory of possibility has not given an analysis of that possibility, only 
an assertion of it. 
The knotty and irreducible nature of the possibility of indefinite replication is 
confirmed by the need for the axioms of mathematics to include an “axiom of 
infinity”. Among the basic axioms of set theory, the most obviously non-logical one – 
the one that is most directly an obstacle to any attempt to regard mathematics as logic 
or as analytically true – is the Axiom of Infinity, stating “There is an infinite set” (or 
equivalently, “The numbers do not run out.”) It is independent of the other axioms.32 
There is no passage via logic or simple recombination from the finite to the possibility 
of the infinite. 
The problem of the relation of the necessities of quantity to the contingencies of 
actual magnitudes does not exhaust the puzzles concerning space and quantity. The 
theory of the ancients that arithmetic studies discrete quantity and geometry studies 
continuous quantity encounters the problem that geometry also studies shape. Shape is 
assigned by Aristotle to the category of quality, and it can vary completely 
independently of size, in that a given shape can be realised in a figure of any size (in 
Euclidean space, at least). Yet the relation between size and shape must be more 
intimate than that suggests, since if the disposition of the points of a body is 
determined, both the shape and the size of the body supervene. A philosophy of 
 
29 Armstrong, Combinatorial Theory, 125. 
30 Armstrong, Combinatorial Theory, 56. 
31 Armstrong, Combinatorial Theory, 58-60. 
32 Originally denied by Bertrand Russell but conceded in Principia Mathematica (A.N. Whitehead and 
B. Russell,  Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963, II, 203).  
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geometry is required to resolve the problem. The field is undeveloped and will not be 
attempted here.33 
A further problem concerns the “geometry” of quantities themselves. If we take 
the “space” of vector quantities of a single kind, say the space of all possible forces on 
a body (in 3D), then that space has a natural geometry. Vectors have length, distance 
between them, and angles. The geometry is always Euclidean. Does this give 
Euclidean geometry a special position of privilege in the space of forms, even if that 
position has been denied to it in the geometry of real space? The problem even has a 
one-dimensional version. If we keep firing an arrow forward in actual space, it is 
possible that we may eventually come back to where we started (if space is finite, 
curved and has no boundary). But if we take a quantity such as a length and keep 
adding it to itself, we cannot come back to where we started. The “geometry” of the 
space of lengths is necessarily infinite. It remains unclear why that is so. 
Suarez raised a complex of other problems, related to the question of the relation 
of the length of a body to its occupancy of space. His theory is that length (or area or 
volume) is “aptitudinally situal”.34 The problem that he has principally in mind is how 
the body of Christ in the Eucharist can have the dimensions of a human body yet fit in 
the space of a host.35 He also considers the problem of condensation and rarefaction, 
where a body occupies different amounts of space over time.36 That raises the 
somewhat different problem of the relation of the quantity of stuff in a substance 
(possibly to be identified with the scientific concept of mass) and its spatial 
dimensions. Further problems concern the exclusion of two bodies from the same 
space. Whether or not Suarez’s theory solves all those problems, the phrase 
“aptitudinally situal” is suggestive even when restricted to the problem of the relation 
of length and space. A rigid body is apt for being situated in any space obtainable by 
translations and rotations from the space it actually occupies, while a non-rigid body 
 
33 One realist approach in G. Nerlich, The Shape of Space, 2nd ed, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994; theories surveyed in L. Sklar, Space, Time and Spacetime, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of Calfornia Press, 1974. 
34 Francisco Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations 40, discussed in D.P. Lang, Aquinas and Suarez on the 
essence of continuous physical quantity, Laval théologique et philosophique 58 (3) (2002), 565-595. 
35 Francisco Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations 40, “On Continuous Quantity” section 2, trans. R. 
Pasnau, at http://spot.colorado.edu/~pasnau/research/suarez%20dm40-2.pdf 
36 Lang, 593. 
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of fixed volume is apt for being situated in a greater range of spaces, and a 
compressible body in still more spaces. 
 
Discrete quantity, numbers and sets 
 
Discrete quantities arise in quite a different way from ratios. It is characteristic of 
“unit-making” or “count” universals like “being an apple” or “being a horse” (in 
Aristotle’s example) to structure their instances discretely. That is what distinguishes 
them from mass universals like “being water”. A heap of apples stands in a certain 
relation to “being an apple”. That relation is the number of apples in the heap. The 
same relation can hold between a heap of shoes and “being a shoe”. The number is 
just what these binary relations have in common.37 
Aristotle emphasized – if a little cryptically –  the relativity of number to the 
universal being used to divide the mass being counted into units: 
‘The one’ means the measure of some plurality, and ‘number’ means a 
measured plurality and a plurality of measures … The measure must always be 
some identical thing predicable of all the things it measures, e.g. if the things are 
horses, the measure is ‘horse’, and if they are men, ‘man’. If they are a man, a 
horse, and a god, the measure is perhaps ‘living being’, and the number of them 
will be a number of living beings.38 
Thus, suppose there are seven black swans on the lake now. The proposition 
refers to a part of the world, the black biomass on the lake, and a structuring property, 
being a black swan on the lake now. Both are necessary to determining that the 
relation between the mass and the property should be “seven”: if it were a different 
mass (e.g. the black swans on or beside the lake) or a different unit-making property 
(e.g. being a swan organ on the lake now) then the numerical relation would be 
 
37 From D.M. Armstrong, Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 
ch. 13; originally from  P. Forrest and D.M. Armstrong, The nature of number, Philosophical Papers 
16 (1987), 165-186 and mostly in G. Kessler, Frege, Mill and the foundations of arithmetic, Journal of 
Philosophy 77 (1980), 65-79. 
38 Aristotle, Metaphysics bk 14 ch. 1, 1088a4-11, further in H.G. Apostle, Aristotle’s Philosophy of 
Mathematics, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1952; V.E. Smith, St Thomas on the Object of 
Geometry, Milwaukee: Marquette  University Press, 1954; D. Bostock, Aristotle’s philosophy of 
mathematics, in Oxford Handbook on Aristotle, to appear. 
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different. Therefore numbers are not properties of parts of the world simply, but must 
be properties of the relation between parts of the world and the unit-making properties 
that structure them. 
So the fact that the heap of shoes stands in one such numerical relation to “being 
a shoe” and another numerical relation to “being a pair of shoes” (made much of by 
Frege39) does not show that the number of a heap is subjective, or not about 
something in the world, but only that number is relative to the count universal being 
considered. For Aristotelians, the universal is real and so is its relation to the heap it 
structures. 
Whereas ratios have nothing to do with sets, numbers are intimately connected 
with them. Given a set, there is something to count. And conversely, if there is 
counting, there is a set of entities being counted, and indeed sets are good for little 
else. Given a heap and a unit-making property structuring it, there is immediately 
created (there supervenes) both the set of things of which the heap is the mereological 
sum, and a number of things in that set. If there is no unit-making property – if there 
is just stuff – there is no number and no set. If there is a unit-making property, there is 
a set and a number of elements in the set. 
So what are sets, from an Aristotelian point of view? The Aristotelian cannot rest 
content with the Platonist story that sets are a simple Platonist entity at which 
questions should stop, and that the membership relation is sui generis. That 
conception is problematic, but even if it were intelligible and satisfactory, it would 
interpose a Platonist entity in a story where there should be no role for it, the story of 
how unit-making properties structure a heap into something able to be counted. 
The Aristotelian desires a theory according to which sets are ontologically 
nothing over and above there being a unit-making property to structure a heap. 
Several closely-related theories are available. The leading one is that of David 
Armstrong. He adopts David Lewis’s proposal that a set is the mereological sum of its 
singletons, and adds the idea that the singleton of x is simply the state of affairs of 
 
39 G. Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), trans. J.L. Austin, 2nd revised ed, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1980, §22, p. 28 and §54, p. 66. 
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there being some unit-making universal that singles out x.40 The essence of the 
suggestion is that at the basic philosophical level necessary in these questions, we 
cannot help ourselves naively to the notion of “object”. When we assert “The cat sat 
on the mat”, “The”, in “the cat”, indicates that we are dealing with a single unified 
object, cut out from the background. In the apparent continuum of matter that is the 
universe and the flux it undergoes, what cuts out the single warm furry item, draws its 
boundaries and points it out as an individual thing deserving a common noun?41 It is 
the property, the repeatable unit-making property “being a cat”, that cuts the cat from 
the background, and in doing so creates a singleton (and when actually repeated 
creates other sets) and at the same time creates something to be counted. 
 
The epistemology of quantity: perception, measurement, counting and 
understanding 
 
There is a tension in Aristotelian views on how quantity is known. On the one 
hand, quantity as a real property of things is easily perceivable, so Aristotelians need 
no non-naturalist story of access to Platonic entities to account for basic knowledge of 
quantities. On the other hand, the more emphasis is placed on the perceivability of 
quantity, the harder it becomes to account for the characteristic certainty of our 
knowledge about quantity (referred to in the opening of this article), a certainty 
underpinned by mathematical proof and apparently extending well beyond the scope 
of the perceivable world – extending even to higher orders of infinity, according to the 
majority view. 
It is impossible here to give a full overview of the problem, but it is possible to 
give some insight into the basic distinctions that Aristotelians must draw between 
perceptual and intellectual knowledge – a distinction in fact best illustrated by our 
knowledge of quantity. 
 
40 D.M. Armstrong, Classes are states of affairs, Mind 100 (1991), 189-200; several proposals listed in 
A. Paseau, Motivating reductionism about sets, Australasian J. of Philosophy 86 (2008), 295-307. 
41 B.C. Smith, On the Origin of Objects, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996. 
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Extensive research on animals and human babies has shown that they have 
considerable skills in the perception of approximates sizes and numerosities.42 For 
examples, human babies, as soon after birth as it is possible to experiment on them, 
display the ability to distinguish a group of two sounds from a group of three.43 All 
but the very simplest estimates are inherently fuzzy and do not involve any operation 
like counting or measuring. It is interesting that even at this early stage, quantity has 
an epistemological advantage over other categories in being accessible by more than 
one sense; as Aristotle remarks, “‘Common sensibles’ are movement, rest, number, 
figure, magnitude; these are not peculiar to any one sense, but are common to all.”44 
Later, but still in infancy, humans learn to count exactly and to measure. 
According to the view of sets sketched above, it should be possible to perceive and 
hence count sets, once one has recognised the count-universal that structures the heap. 
As argued by Penelope Maddy, if I open an egg carton and see that there are three 
eggs in it, I perceive both the pale curved surface of the egg-heap and that it is 
structured by “being an egg” into three parts, each an egg. That is sufficient to 
perceive the heap as a set of three eggs.45 Such abilities are the ones developed in 
early mathematical education, usually with great difficulty but eventual success.46 
Measurement, like counting, requires the addition of a kind of intellectual 
recognition to simple perceptual rough-and-ready estimation of magnitude. The 
theory of measurement displays particularly clearly the difference between a Platonist 
and an Aristotelian approach to quantity. The usual approach to measurement sets up 
the problem with a Platonist bias, concentrating on “representation theorems” that 
 
42 E.g. S. Dehaene, The Number Sense: How the mind creates mathematics,  New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997); A. Bisazza. L. Piffer, G. Serena and C. Agrillo, Ontogeny of numerical 
abilities in fish, PLoS ONE 5(11) (2010), e15516. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015516; W. Mack, 
Numerosity discrimination: Infants discriminate small from large numerosities, European Journal of 
Developmental Psychology 3 (2006), 31-47; S. Cordes and E.M. Brannon , The relative salience of 
discrete and continuous quantity in young infants, Developmental Science 12 (3) (2009), 453–463. 
43 R. Bijeljac-Babic, J. Bertoncini and J. Mehler, How do four-day-old infants categorize multisyllabic 
utterances? Developmental Psychology 29 (1993), 711-21; visual parallels in S.E. Antell and D.P. 
Keating, Perception of numerical invariance in neonates, Child Development 54 (1983), 695-701. 
44 Aristotle, De Anima II.6, 418a16-20. 
45 P. Maddy, Realism in Mathematics, 58-67. 
46 Z.P. Dienes, Building Up Mathematics, London: Hutchinson, 1960, esp. ch. 2; A. Baroody, M.-L. 
Lai and K.S. Mix, The development of young children’s early number and operation sense and its 
implications for early childhood education, in B. Spodek and O.N. Saracho, eds, Handbook of Research 
on the Education of Young Children, 2nd ed, Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2006, ch. 11. 
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describe the conditions under which quantities can be represented by numbers.47 That 
poses the problem as if it is one about the association of numbers to parts of the 
world, which inevitably leads to a Platonist or nominalist perspective. 
But a closer look suggests an Aristotelian reinterpretation. What is it about the 
quantitative properties of the measured world that ensures that a representation by 
numbers exists? The standard treatment (of measurement of length) begins by looking 
at the properties of concatenating identical rods, and axiomatizing those properties as 
a basis for showing that a representation by numbers exists.48 But the quantitative 
properties exist prior to the representation and are the condition of its existence: as the 
Aristotelian maintains, the system of ratios of lengths, for example, pre-exists in the 
physical things being measured, and measurement consists in identifying the ratios 
that are of interest in a particular case; the arbitrary choice of unit that allows ratios to 
be converted to digital numerals for ease of calculation is something that happens at 
the last step.49 That in turn suggests an Aristotelian realist view of the real numbers 
arising in measurement. As the Joel Michell puts it, in language similar to that used of 
ratios above: 
The commitment that measurable attributes sustain ratios has a further 
implication, viz., that the real numbers are spatiotemporally located relations. It 
commits us to a realist view of number. If Smith’s weight is 90 kg, then this is 
equivalent to asserting that the real number, 90, is a kind of relation, viz., the 
kind of relation holding between Smith’s weight and the weight of the standard 
kilogram. Since these weights are real, spatiotemporally located instances of the 
attribute, any relation holding between them will likewise be real and 
spatiotemporally located. This kind of relation is what was referred to above as 
a ratio. So the realist view of measurement implies that real numbers are 
ratios.50 
 
47 E.g. C.W. Savage and P. Ehrlich, Philosophical and Foundational Issues in Measurement Theory, 
Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum, 1992. 
48 D.H. Krantz, R.D. Luce, P. Suppes and A. Tversky, Foundations of Measurement, vol. 1, New York: 
Academic, 1971, ch. 1. 
49 Similar comments in Bigelow and  Pargetter, Science and Necessity, 60-61. 
50 J. Michell, The logic of measurement: a realist overview, Measurement 38 (2005), 285-294; relation 
to Aristotle discussed in C.B. Crowley, Aristotelian-Thomistic Philosophy of Measure and the 
International System of Units (SI), Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1996. 
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Measurement and counting inform us that certain particulars have certain 
quantities. General truths about quantity are another matter entirely, and it is here that 
Aristotelian epistemology, at least in its traditional form, parts company with 
naturalism. According to traditional Aristotelianism, the human intellect possesses an 
ability completely different in kind from anything possessed by animals, an ability to 
abstract universals and understand their relations. 
Although philosophically mysterious, it is easy to exhibit this ability in practice – 
and easiest to do so in cases involving quantity. For example, in this diagram, 
 
 
 
Fig 2  Why  2 × 3   =  3 × 2 
 
the point of the ovals is to guide the visual system so as to group the six objects as 
alternately two sets of triples and three sets of pairs. That is what allows the intellect 
to grasp the relation between the parts and hence achieve its certain knowledge of the 
equation 2 × 3   =  3 × 2. The mind know only knows that 2 × 3   =  3 × 2, but has an 
insight or understanding of why it must be so. 
According to the model of science in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, a true 
science differs from a heap of observational facts – even a heap of true empirical 
generalisations – by being organised into a system of deductions from self-evidently 
true axioms which express the nature of the universals involved. Ideally, each 
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deduction from the premises allows the human understanding to grasp why the 
conclusion must be true. Euclid’s geometry, the model for all of pure mathematics 
since, conforms closely to Aristotle’s model.51 As we saw, although it is an empirical 
question whether Euclidean geometry applies to physical space, spaces of vector 
quantities are Euclidean so Euclid’s geometry is still a science of reality. 
The Aristotelianism of the scholastics maintained that such an ability to grasp 
pure relations of universals was so far removed from sensory knowledge as to prove 
that the “active intellect” must be immaterial and immortal.52 That is not an idea that 
has found much favour in modern philosophy, for obvious reasons. But the complete 
inability of the Artificial Intelligence project to imitate human understanding (as 
opposed to human calculation, information retrieval or pattern recognition) suggests 
that providing a naturalistic substitute for the “active intellect” is far from easy. 
 
Quantity and the philosophy of mathematics 
 
As we have seen, a great deal is known about the quantitative properties of things 
– about lengths, ratios and relations between ratios, about discrete quantities and their 
addition, and so on. That body of knowledge bears an uncanny resemblance to the 
subject taught in schools under the name “mathematics”. Therefore the existence of 
quantities, discrete and continuous, counted and measured, properties of real bodies, 
has suggested to many a realist but non-Platonist philosophy of mathematics. From 
the time of Aristotle to the eighteenth century, one philosophy of mathematics 
dominated the field. Mathematics, it was said, is the “science of quantity”. Discrete 
quantity is studied by arithmetic and continuous quantity by geometry. A version of 
an Aristotelian theory of mathematics as a realist science of quantity, both discrete 
and continuous, was standard and virtually unchallenged in early modern times.53  
 
51 R.D. McKirahan, Principles and Proofs: Aristotle’s theory of demonstrative science (Princeton, 
1992), ch. 12.  
52 Z. Kuksewicz, The potential and the agent intellect, ch. 29 of The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann et al (Cambridge, 1988); Y.R. Simon, Nature and the process 
of mathematical abstraction, The Thomist 29 (1965), 117-39; D. McGraw, Intellectual abstraction as 
incompatible with materialism, Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (2) (1995), 23-30. 
53 E.g. I. Barrow, The Usefulness of Mathematical Learning Explained and Demonstrated, London, 
1734, repr. London: Cass, 1970, 10-15; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1st ed., Edinburgh, 1771, article 
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The quantity theory plainly gives an initially reasonable picture of at least 
elementary mathematics, with its emphasis on counting, measuring, and calculating 
with the resulting numbers. It promises direct answers to questions about what the 
object of mathematics is (certain properties of physical and possibly non-physical 
things such as their size), and how those properties are known (the same way other 
natural properties of physical things are known – by perception in simple cases and 
inference from perception in more complex ones).  
The realist quantity theory apparently then died in the nineteenth century, partly 
from lack of defence but partly from Frege’s criticisms of the possibility of 
mathematics being about properties of the real world. Under Frege’s influence, 
twentieth-century philosophy of mathematics was dominated by an oscillation 
between Platonism and nominalism in its various forms (including logicism and 
formalism). Frege and many later authors defended a Platonist view of the reality of 
the “abstract objects” of mathematics such as numbers and sets,54 while nominalists 
tried to show that mathematics as applied in science can do without reference to such 
objects.55 
 Needless to say, that created endless difficulties in accounting for applied 
mathematics, since both Platonism and nominalism make it hard to see how 
mathematics can be so successful in real-world applications. 56 It also created an 
irreconcilable conflict between ontology and epistemology in mathematics, with 
Platonism taking the well-known objectivity of mathematics seriously but leaving it 
mysterious how we can access objects in another world, and nominalism making 
epistemology easy but making the objectivity and applicability of mathematics a 
 
‘Mathematics’, vol. III  30-1; P. Mancosu, Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in 
the Seventeenth Century, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 16, 35-37, 56, 88; D.M. Jesseph, 
Berkeley’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, ch. 1; late 
developments in J. Michell, Bertrand Russell’s 1897 critique of the traditional theory of measurement, 
Synthese 110 (1997), 257-276. 
54 Notable recent examples include S. Shapiro, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1997; J.R. Brown, Philosophy of Mathematics: An introduction to 
the world of proofs and pictures, London: Routledge, 1999; M. Colyvan, The Indispensability of 
Mathematics , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.  
55 H. Field, Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1980; J. Azzouni, Deflating Existential Consequence: a case for nominalism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004. 
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mystery.57 The neglect of epistemology accounts for two strange absences in the 
philosophy of mathematics: understanding (and mathematics is where one first goes to 
experience pure understanding) and measurement (the primary way in which 
mathematics joins to the world). Lastly, there is the divorce between the philosophy of 
mathematics, on the one hand, and developmental psychology and mathematics 
education, on the other – surely the considerable knowledge of infants’ mathematical 
learning, much of which is about quantity should be compatible with the correct 
philosophy of mathematics? An Aristotelian realism, centred on a realist 
understanding of quantity, shows obvious promise of resolving these tensions, by 
exhibiting real properties of things that can be the objects of learning in children, the 
objects of understanding in adults, and the basis of the applications of applied 
mathematics. It is time for a revival of moderate realism in the philosophy of 
mathematics, starting with the philosophy of quantity. 58 
 
 
 
56 S. Körner, The Philosophy of Mathematics: An introductory essay  (London, 1960), 176-183; M. 
Steiner, The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1998). 
57 Noted in P. Benacerraf, Mathematical truth, Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973), 661-679. 
58 A preliminary effort in J. Franklin, Aristotelian realism, in The Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. A. 
Irvine (Handbook of the Philosophy of Science series), Amsterdam: North-Holland Elsevier, 2009, 
101-153; overview in J. Franklin, Aristotelianism in the philosophy of mathematics, Studia 
Neoaristotelica 8 (2011), 3-15 (in that theory “quantity” as an object of mathematics is supplemented 
by “structure”). Other works with Aristotelian tendencies include J. Bigelow, The Reality of Numbers: 
A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford: Clarendon, 1988; J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, 
Science and Necessity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, ch. 2; A.D. Irvine, ed, 
Physicalism in Mathematics, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990. 
